Introduction
It is well documented that multinationals shift income across jurisdictions (Dischinger and Riedel 2011; Dyreng and Lindsey 2009; Klassen and Laplante 2012; Newberry and Dhaliwal 2001, among others) . Markle (2016) shows that parent companies subject to worldwide tax systems shift income to a lesser extent than parent companies subject to territorial systems.
Under a worldwide system with deferral (as implemented in the United States), firms pay taxes on their worldwide income when dividends are repatriated regardless of the origin thereof, whereas countries with a territorial system exempt foreign-source income from taxation. 1 To avoid double taxation, tax authorities in worldwide tax systems grant a credit for taxes paid in a foreign jurisdiction (foreign tax credit). Less income shifting by parent companies subject to worldwide tax systems can be interpreted as being less tax aggressive across jurisdictions.
However, the reduced incentive to be less tax aggressive across jurisdictions, as documented by Markle (2016) , is not the only incentive arising from worldwide tax systems.
We test whether U.S. multinationals are less tax aggressive within jurisdictions where their foreign subsidiaries are located, when the statutory tax rate in a subsidiary's home country is lower than the U.S. statutory tax rate. This theory was laid out in Scholes et al. (2015, p. 315 ).
The rationale is that a U.S. investor pays the difference between the tax payment abroad and the U.S. statutory tax rate when profits are repatriated, whereas investors located in countries with territorial tax systems gain the full tax savings from being tax aggressive abroad. Thus, the benefit of tax aggressiveness of foreign U.S.-owned subsidiaries is absent or reduced. We focus 3 our analyses on U.S.-owned foreign subsidiaries, as, currently, the United States is the only member of the G8 that has a worldwide tax system.
Our research question implies that we focus on the tax positions taken by multinationals'
foreign affiliates. Thus, we are interested in differences in the tax aggressiveness of foreign affiliates. Tax aggressiveness is a broad concept that is influenced by international tax minimization strategies, such as income shifting, and by pursuing domestic tax minimization strategies, such as claiming bonus depreciation or choosing a domestic location for a foreign affiliate that minimizes regional taxes and surcharges. While there is no doubt that multinationals shift income to jurisdictions with low tax rates, all income (including the shifted income) will eventually be taxed, although the tax rate in tax havens might be close to zero. However, due to constraints on income shifting (e.g. the arm's length principle, CFC rules), most foreign subsidiaries still pay tax in the jurisdiction where they are located, and anecdotal evidence of multinationals not paying any taxes is rather the exception than the rule. 2 Thus, we investigate whether multinationals' foreign subsidiaries have different outcomes of tax aggressiveness incentivized by their parents' being subject to either a worldwide tax system or a territorial tax system. We choose GAAP effective tax rates (ETRs) as our measure to quantify ex post the extent of aggressive tax positions taken by foreign affiliates.
4 U.S. multinationals act as if they were subject to a territorial system because there is the possibility to defer taxation until repatriation, and in that way multinationals can wait for another tax holiday to circumvent repatriation taxes. Recent media attention on tax avoidance strategies of, for example, Apple, Amazon, Google, and Starbucks which build up large amounts of cash overseas, corroborates the notion that multinationals do not intend to repatriate unless another tax holiday arises. 4 For these highly profitable multinationals this is a superior strategy, as their costs of issuing debt to refinance their activities within the United States are historically low -and lower than the repatriation taxes . This suggests that we should not be able to see any (or at least only very small) differences in the tax aggressiveness of U.S.-and non-U.S.-owned subsidiaries.
To study whether U.S.-owned subsidiaries are less tax aggressive than other foreign subsidiaries, we use unconsolidated financial statements of European private firms owned by foreign shareholders. We start with a detailed analysis of U.S.-owned subsidiaries in Germany, 5 and our results suggest that subsidiaries of U.S. investors have approximately a 1.2 percentage point higher average GAAP effective tax rate (ETR) compared to subsidiaries of foreign investors located in countries with a territorial system. Furthermore, the higher ETR is driven by subsidiaries where both the ultimate and the immediate parent are incorporated in the United
States.
We verify that the German finding holds in other European countries. In a sample of seven European countries with sufficient data and tax burden (domestic statutory tax rate plus 5 withholding tax according to income tax treaties) below the U.S. statutory tax rate of 35% (Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy, and Sweden), we find in each country that U.S.-owned subsidiaries are less tax aggressive compared to other foreign subsidiaries.
Belgium, France, Norway, and Spain have a statutory tax burden for U.S.-owned subsidiaries exceeding the U.S. statutory tax rate. In this case, U.S.-owned subsidiaries are expected to be less tax aggressive only if their average foreign effective tax rate exceeds the U.S.
statutory tax rate, as the U.S. tax system features an overall limitation on the foreign tax credit.
However, U.S.-owned subsidiaries are less likely to pay additional taxes upon repatriation in these countries, and we expect to find U.S.-owned subsidiaries to be as tax aggressive as other foreign-owned subsidiaries. In fact, we find in two countries (Belgium and France) that U.S. Our results are economically meaningful. The "excess" tax payments of U.S.-owned subsidiaries account, on average, for a reduction in return on equity of 0.5 percentage points per annum, neglecting potential costs of tax aggressiveness. Thus, U.S. investments into foreign subsidiaries are disadvantaged compared to investments from countries with a territorial tax system. We contribute to the literature in three ways. First, our results suggest that the tax system to which the parent company is subject and its interplay with foreign tax systems shapes taxrelevant decisions of multinationals and their subsidiaries. In line with the theory provided by Scholes et al. (2015) , we show that a worldwide tax system not only affects income shifting (Atwood, Drake, Myers, and Myers 2012; Markle 2016) , but also provides incentives for those subsidiaries operating abroad to be less tax aggressive.
Second, our findings contradict the assertions seen in the political debate that U.S. multinationals act as if they were in a territorial system because they can defer home country taxation by declaring profits earned abroad as permanently reinvested. If this were the case, subsidiaries with U.S. investors should be as tax aggressive as subsidiaries with investors from any other country.
Finally, our paper contributes to the academic, political, and public media discussion revolving around the costs and benefits of a worldwide versus territorial tax system. On the one hand, some studies document benefits of a worldwide tax system, such as decreased incidence of income shifting across jurisdictions (Atwood et al. 2012; Markle 2016) . On the other hand, the worldwide tax system with deferral triggered unintended consequences since multinationals 7 accumulate large amounts of cash overseas waiting for being repatriated when another U.S. tax holiday comes (Fleischer 2012; Kocieniewski 2011; Linebaugh 2012) . We show that U.S.-owned subsidiaries are less tax aggressive within jurisdictions as indicated by higher ETRs in foreign jurisdiction. In turn this reduces the amount the U.S. tax authority gains when profits are repatriated. Thus, the reduced tax aggressiveness of subsidiaries is a windfall profit for the tax authorities of the subsidiary's home country.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the institutional setting and develops the hypothesis. Section 3 (4) explains the research design and findings on the German (European) sample and section 5 contains robustness tests and further results. Section 6 concludes.
Institutional Setting and Hypothesis Development
In cross-border economic activities, three layers of taxation apply to the profit transfer from a foreign subsidiary to a parent company. First, the foreign country levies corporate income tax on the profit of the subsidiary (tsub). Second, in case that the subsidiary distributes dividends, the foreign tax authority levies withholding taxes on the dividend distribution (twth). Third, the home country of the parent can tax the dividends and grants a credit for taxes paid abroad (worldwide system, tpar) or exempts the dividends from tax (territorial system). Thus, in case that a worldwide country grants a credit for the taxes paid by the subsidiary and the withholding taxes, the tax burden is characterized by the following expression:
In case of a territorial system the tax burden on dividend distributions amounts to:
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As can be seen from the two equations, the tax burden of the two alternatives differs when the tax rate in the parent's home country is higher than the corporate income tax rate in the subsidiary's home country plus withholding tax on dividend distributions. In this case, additional home country taxation occurs when dividends are repatriated which provides a disincentive to repatriate profits earned abroad. This is often the case if a firm is owned by U.S. investors since (i) the U.S. is the only G8 member with a worldwide tax system and (ii) the U.S. statutory tax rate of 35% is higher than tax rates in most other countries.
A few studies address the impact of foreign tax credits on multinationals' behavior. Collins and Shackelford (1992) The incentive increases if firms are less financially constrained and more technology intensive (Albring, Mills, and Newberry 2011; Foley, Hartzell, and Titman 2007) . Another consequence is 9 high cash holdings abroad of U.S. multinationals. Hanlon et al. (2015) show that locked-out cash is associated with foreign acquisitions. Blouin and Krull (2009) Because of the worldwide tax system and the high U.S. tax rate we argue that U.S.-owned subsidiaries are less tax aggressive than subsidiaries from countries with a territorial system. The rationale for this is that if U.S. investors repatriate foreign earnings, they will pay the higher U.S.
tax rate eventually. 6 Generally, the decision to engage in aggressive tax strategies depends on the 10 costs and benefits for the involved parties. Tax savings lead to rent extraction for shareholders and to higher salaries/bonuses for managers if the interests of both groups are aligned. Whereas the benefits are obvious, the costs of tax avoidance can be direct or indirect. Direct costs are, for example, the costs of establishing complex tax structures within the group, as well as payments for tax advisors. Indirect costs are, for example, the increased likelihood of sanctions from the tax authorities and reputational costs. Assuming that multinationals have scarce resources and the benefit of tax aggressiveness of subsidiaries owned by U.S. investors is reduced, these investors might have fewer incentives to avoid taxes in the foreign subsidiary. However, the U.S.
worldwide tax system offers the possibility to defer additional home country taxation until dividends are repatriated and in that way multinationals can wait for another tax holiday to circumvent repatriation taxes. Thus, it is an empirical question as to whether U.S.-owned subsidiaries are less tax aggressive. We state our hypothesis as follows.
H: U.S.-owned subsidiaries abroad are less tax aggressive than subsidiaries owned by investors from a country with a territorial system if the U.S. tax rate is above the foreign tax rate.
German Sample

Sample and Research Design
In theory, the average tax rate of all foreign operations is the correct comparison for the U.S. tax rate to decide upon being tax aggressive abroad. However, given the tax rate cuts in many countries, it is unlikely that U.S. multinationals face weighted average tax rates over all their foreign activities above the U.S. statutory tax rate. Thus, we are confident that a country by country analysis is feasible even though the U.S. foreign tax credit is computed using the overall limitation.
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Data is gathered from Hoppenstedt and Orbis. We obtain financial statement data from the Hoppenstedt Database and shareholder data from the Orbis Database. As the data sets available to the authors do not have a common identifier, we match both data sets using the German Commercial Register Number (GCRN).
We use German unconsolidated financial statements until 2009, as private firm data are available and Germany features a high book-tax alignment for that time period (Pfaff and Schröer 1996) . In 2010, new German GAAP was introduced and the book-tax conformity was reduced. We do not include data before 2005 since there is no shareholder information available to us. Thus, our sample period is 2005 -2009. 7 Although there was a tax cut in Germany effective in 2008, the average effective tax rate of the sample is below 35% in all years.
We limit the shareholder data to shareholdings from corporations. We delete subsidiaries with negative pretax income in order to calculate the effective tax rates. Furthermore, we delete observations with missing data on total assets, net income, and tax expense. The final sample consists of 4,199 firm-year observations of subsidiaries that are wholly-owned by foreign investors.
In Germany, unconsolidated statements are the basis for determining taxable profit. Thus, the unconsolidated financial statement captures the income generated in Germany that will be taxed by the tax authorities. However, differences between financial accounting and tax accounting arise from specific tax rules (Pfaff and Schröer 1996) . Tax avoiding strategies are, for example, choosing the location of a subsidiary within Germany such that regionally variant taxes (local business taxes) are minimized, and minimizing non-tax deductible expenses. While it is hard to say which strategies the subsidiaries in our sample actually apply, tax audit statistics 12 published by the German Federal Ministry of Finance show that additional tax revenue of around €17.2 billion was raised in 2013 due to tax audits. This suggests that German firms take some aggressive tax positions which are not approved by the tax authorities. Therefore, our measure of tax aggressiveness is the result of all tax minimization strategies taken by the foreign subsidiary within the respective jurisdiction and thus a measure of the subsidiaries' tax aggressiveness. We cannot use cash-based tax avoidance measures, as European firms are not required to publish cash flow statements for their unconsolidated statements. Therefore, the effective tax rate is then computed as income tax plus deferred tax deflated by pretax income.
The dependent variable is ETR and our main variable of interest is an indicator variable that takes on the value of one if a subsidiary is wholly owned by U.S. shareholders (US100).
Furthermore, the models use the following control variables: return on assets (ROA), debt ratio (DEBT), intangible assets (INTANG), size measured as the logarithm of total assets (SIZE), the ratio of property, plant and equipment over total assets (PPE), and BIG5 is coded one if the respective company is audited by one of the five top auditors in Germany (BDO, Deloitte, EY, KPMG, PWC). 9 We do not control for application of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) since German firms are required to use local GAAP for the unconsolidated statements.
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8 The German tax authorities make certain amendments to the profits of the unconsolidated statement. One of the most significant is that only 5% of the dividends are subject to taxation. Furthermore, the depreciation of shares in affiliated companies is not tax-deductible. To make sure that our measure of tax avoidance picks up tax planning and is not predominantly driven by systematic differences that result in permanent book-tax differences by default, we correct for both positions. Furthermore, ETRs are a meaningful measure of tax avoidance, only if the denominator is derived from financial accounting. If the denominator were the "true" taxable income, the effective tax rate would equal the statutory tax rate. Thus, we do not aim at computing the true taxable income, but correct only for positions which by default create permanent differences between financial and tax accounting, and thus cannot be classified as tax planning. 9 In addition to the BIG4 auditing companies, BDO is often considered as among the top auditors in Germany. 10 De Simone (2016) shows that the introduction of IFRS for unconsolidated statements in some European countries affected tax-motivated income shifting.
13 Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics of our sample. 12.8% of the sample is wholly-owned by U.S. investors (537 firm-year observations). The average tax rate is 31%.
Approximately 20% of the sample is audited by one of the Big5 auditing firms. As the sample is limited to subsidiaries with pretax profits in order to compute tax rates, subsidiaries are on average highly profitable. The average return on assets is 9.6%. Property, plant and equipment account on average for 16.0% of total assets and intangible assets amount on average to approximately 2%. Panel B and Panel C contain the descriptive statistics separately for U.S.-and non-U.S.-owned subsidiaries. In line with our hypothesis, the average tax rate of U.S.-owned subsidiaries is higher than the average tax rate of the control sample (31.7% vs. 30.8%). Pearson and Spearman correlations are shown in Table 2 . US100 is positively but statistically insignificantly correlated with ETR. ETR is significantly negatively correlated with profitability (ROA). Table 1 and Table 2 here
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Findings: Germany
The main results of the German sample are shown in Table 3 . Standard errors are clustered at the investor home country. In line with our hypothesis, Model 1 shows that fully U.S.-owned subsidiaries have a statistically significant 1.2 percentage point higher tax rate than subsidiaries from countries with a territorial system.
11 In Model 2 we control for other 11 Germany exhibited a corporate income tax rate cut of 10 percentage points in 2008 which we control for by using year fixed effects. Furthermore, we control for differences between legal forms because our sample of foreignowned subsidiaries consists of Gesellschaften mit beschränkter Haftung (GmbH) -which are comparable to S corporations, and Aktiengesellschaften (AG) -which are comparable to C corporations. Both legal forms, however, entail limited liability.
14 determinants of tax aggressiveness and we include NON_EU which is coded one if the investor is located in a non-EU country, and zero otherwise. As U.S.-owned subsidiaries form part of the non-EU countries, the coefficient of US100 can now be interpreted as the additional effect of the U.S. investor over and above the average effect of all non-EU countries. Thereby, we rule out that our results are driven by geographical distance or institutional knowledge assuming that investors from other non-EU countries have a similar knowledge of the German tax system.
The coefficient of 0.012 means that U.S.-owned subsidiaries pay 1.2 Euro-Cent (€0.012) more taxes on each Euro earned compared to other non-German subsidiaries. To give an economic magnitude, we calculate the reduction in return on equity due to the reduced tax aggressiveness of wholly U.S.-owned subsidiaries. We divide the "excess" tax payments of wholly U.S.-owned subsidiaries by the level of equity of these subsidiaries. Neglecting potential costs of tax planning, U.S.-owned subsidiaries lose, on average, 0.5 percentage points return on equity (ROE) per annum.
Insert Table 3 here Models 3 and 4 contain cross-sectional tests. In Model 3 we include an indicator variable IMM that is coded one when the ultimate and immediate owner are located in the same country, and zero otherwise. 12 Foreign investors with a less complex group structure abroad might have fewer investment and refinancing opportunities, and are thus more likely to repatriate in a timely manner. Thus, it is less likely that these firms will wait for a tax holiday to avoid repatriation taxes, and that these subsidiaries will have a reduced incentive to be tax aggressive abroad. We 15 expect and find higher ETRs within this subgroup where the immediate owner is located in the same country as the ultimate owner (see interaction US100 * IMM).
In Model 4, we include the variable DIV. The incentive of foreign subsidiaries to be less tax aggressive exists only if the subsidiaries actually pay out dividends. DIV is defined as the ratio of dividends to net income. We do not observe actual dividend payments, but we compute dividends as the net income of the current year minus the change in equity of the following year.
This procedure reduces the sample size to 2,325 firm-year observations. Subsidiaries that pay dividends have a reduced incentive to avoid taxes because it is less likely that they will wait for a tax holiday. The interaction of US100 and DIV has the expected sign, but the significance level is only close to conventional levels (P-Value: 0.148).
In Model 5, we match each U.S.-owned subsidiary based on all covariates with a subsidiary owned by investors from a country with a territorial system. Thus, we compare subsidiaries that are similar across all covariates and their only difference is the parent company's home country. 13 The matching algorithm reduces the sample to 361 U.S. firm-year observations and 361 control firms. Non-tabulated t-tests show that there are no statistical differences between the two groups. The findings are in line with the previous models. 14 Overall, the results of Table 3 show that U.S.-owned subsidiaries have a higher tax rate than subsidiaries that are owned by investors from countries with a territorial system.
Influence of the Parent
Parent company characteristics (e.g. firm size) may influence tax aggressiveness of subsidiaries abroad. Therefore, we use the shareholder identification number to include those characteristics. We obtain this information for 1,809 firm-year observations. Model 1 of Table 4 includes US100 and tests whether U.S.-owned subsidiaries are less tax aggressive. We further control for the characteristics of the subsidiaries ("Sub Control: Yes"), and the displayed control variables are based on the parent companies, denoted by the subscript "p". Model 2 furthermore includes industry, legal form, and year fixed effects. The results show that the characteristics of the parent companies have only limited explanatory power, and the coefficient of US100 remains positive and significant in all specifications. Adding withholding taxes, the total tax burden amounts to 31.1%. This is significantly lower than the effective tax rate of 50.1% because Italian firms classify social security costs paid by the firm as income taxes. Thus, the effective tax rate of 50.1% is overstated and the real tax burden is below the U.S. 35% statutory tax rate.
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Insert Table 5 here
Findings: Less than 35%
Next, we repeat our analysis in different European countries. We split the countries for this analysis based on whether the statutory tax burden exceeds 35%. For countries with a total tax burden below 35% (domestic tax plus withholding tax according to income tax treaties), we expect to find the same results as in the German sample. The regression design is the same as in
Equation 5. Due to limited data availability, we control for only ROA and SIZE. 16 ROA is defined as pretax book income over total assets, and SIZE is defined as the natural logarithm of total 15 Countries with insufficient data on either financial statements or shareholder data are dropped (e.g. for the Netherlands, we observe only 40 firm-year observations with foreign shareholders). 16 In the European sample, we find similar effects for German firms as in the German sample with all controls. Thus, we are confident that controlling for only ROA and SIZE does not influence the results.
18 assets. Table 6 shows the multivariate regression results for European countries with effective tax rates less than 35%.
Column ALL shows that for these countries the effective tax rate is 2.1 percentage points higher if a firm is owned by a U.S. investor. Thus, the effect is stronger compared to the German sample. If we test our hypothesis individually for each country, the coefficient for US100 is always positive and statistically significant in five out of seven countries. In the remaining two countries, the level of significance is only close to conventional levels (P-values for Austria:
0.155, and Italy: 0.126). The magnitude ranges from 1.9 percentage points (Germany 17 and Sweden) to 3.6 percentage points (Finland).
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Insert Table 6 here Findings: Greater than 35%
U.S. multinationals can balance the repatriation tax burden across dividend payments from countries with tax rates above and below 35%. If the average effective tax rates of foreign subsidiaries exceed the U.S. statutory tax rate of 35%, the U.S. tax authorities grant no credit for the taxes paid in excess of 35%. Thus, we do not expect to find the effect documented in the previous sections. Conversely, we expect subsidiaries owned by U.S. parent companies to be as tax aggressive as subsidiaries owned by non-U.S. investors. Therefore, we repeat our analyses for Belgium, France, Norway, and Spain where the statutory tax rate (domestic tax plus withholding tax according to double tax treaties) exceeds 35%. While we cannot be certain that the U.S. 17 Using the Orbis data, we have many more observations in Germany compared to the prior analysis. This is because we (i) need less information in Table 6 due to the limited control variables and (ii) we do not have to merge the data using the German Commercial Register Number. However, the results show that, in this case, the effect seems to be stronger (1.9 percentage points). 18 In Italy, the coefficient of the intercept is relatively high (0.832). This implies that a company would have an effective tax rate of 83.2 percent if all other variables were zero. However, the sample is limited to firm-year observations with positive pretax income and the coefficient of ROA is highly negative. Furthermore, all other coefficients are also negative and the respective variables are non-negative. Thus, all variables have a negative slope, and consequently ETRs are lower than 83.2 percent.
average foreign tax rate also exceeds 35%, we consider it more likely in this sample for two reasons. First, pushing the average tax rate across all countries below 35% is not easy, as many developed countries have a corporate income tax rate around 30%. Second, balancing a high repatriation tax burden with a low one is allowed only for active income (earned through regular, continuous, and substantial operations which are not classified as rental activity), and tax havens usually have low economic power to engage in real operations.
In Table 7 we find a non-significant and slightly negative coefficient across the four countries. When testing each country separately, we find non-statistically significant coefficients of -0.002 and -0.003 for US100 in Belgium and France, respectively. Thus, in these two countries U.S. investors are as tax aggressive as all other investors, indicating that they face an average foreign tax rate above 35%. In Norway and Spain, US100 yields a positive parameter estimate of 0.033 and 0.015, respectively. This indicates that the typical U.S. investor faces an average worldwide tax rate below 35%, and being tax aggressive does not pay off. We investigate these differences in the next section in more detail.
Insert Table 7 Cross-Sectional Tests: Belgium and France
We conclude in the previous section that U.S. investors in Belgium and France are as tax aggressive as all other foreign investors in both countries, based on a null result. To strengthen our line of argumentation, we run two additional tests on Belgium and France. First, we limit our sample to foreign investors that are shareholders in Belgium or France and in a country with a total tax burden below 35%. In this sample (Belgium/France & <35%), we expect U.S.
shareholders to be less tax aggressive than other foreign shareholders because the weighted average foreign tax rate is likely below 35%. Second, we use a sample where foreign 20 shareholders do not have any shareholdings in countries apart from Belgium and France. 19 In this sample the foreign tax rate is above 35% and we expect U.S. shareholders to be as tax aggressive as other foreign shareholders. Table 8 shareholders are more tax aggressive than the other shareholders.
A potential concern of this paper is that less tax aggressive U.S. groups may self-select into specific countries. Table 9 shows that subsidiaries owned by U.K. and Japanese investors are statistically significantly less tax aggressive. While the economic magnitude is very high for Japanese subsidiaries (4.7 percentage points), it is much lower for U.K. subsidiaries (0.3 percentage points).
Column 2 of Table 9 (> 35%) shows that subsidiaries owned by U.K. investors are not less tax aggressive when the statutory tax rate is above 35%. In this case, these subsidiaries have the same incentive to be tax aggressive. We could not conduct this test for Japanese-owned subsidiaries, as only Belgium has a higher tax rate than Japan and we observe only 26 Japaneseowned subsidiaries in Belgium. Overall, using U.K.-and Japanese-owned subsidiaries as treatment countries corroborates our finding that multinationals from countries with worldwide tax regimes are less tax aggressive in their foreign subsidiaries.
Insert Table 9 20 Ideally, we could do a pre-post comparison (difference-in-difference design). However, we do not have sufficient ownership data available for U.K. and Japanese firms after 2009.
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Robustness Tests and Further Results
Different Thresholds
In Table 10 we repeat our analyses from The control sample is defined accordingly. For example, when we investigate firms with more than 25% U.S. investors, the control sample consists of firms that have at least 25% investors from one other non-German country. The results are statistically significant across all models. As one would expect, the coefficient increases with the degree of U.S. investors.
Insert Table 10 here
Long-Run ETR
Our sample does not contain subsidiaries with negative pretax income. This sample selection could potentially affect our results. As tax rates of firm-years with negative pretax income are not meaningful, we cannot simply include them in our sample. However, we can 23 compute long-run effective tax rates over several years and exclude only those subsidiaries where the sum of the pretax income is negative. This has several advantages. First, the sample selection problem is reduced, as we are able to include firm-years with negative pretax income. Second, this approach reduces the problem of tax loss offsetting. And third, Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew (2008) show that annual tax rates are not necessarily predictive of the long-run tax avoidance strategy.
In Table 11 (German sample), we include subsidiaries with at least 3 years of observations, instead of including every subsidiary with at least 1 year of data. The dependent variable is the average tax rate, and -in line with Gallemore and Labro (2015) -we compute our control variables as averages over time. In Model 1, we include the main variable of interest, US100, and fixed effects, and find a significantly positive coefficient of 0.016. When including further controls, the coefficient increases to 0.026. Thus, we still find that U.S.-owned subsidiaries are less tax aggressive.
Insert Table 11 here
Tax Loss Carryforwards
In our multivariate regressions, we do not control for the existence of tax loss carryforwards (TLCFs), as firms are not required to publish their amount of TLCF. This could potentially influence our results if U.S.-owned subsidiaries were more profitable and would thus show less TLCFs than non-U.S.-owned subsidiaries. We address this concern by limiting our sample to subsidiaries with more than one consecutive year of positive pretax income, and then delete the first observation of each firm. Such a reduced sample is less prone to the influence of TLCF, as firms would offset (at least partly) TLCFs in the first profitable year after the tax loss.
For the reduced sample, we find that U.S.-owned subsidiaries have higher ETRs than the control 24 sample (Table 12 , German sample). The effect is even greater than in our main analysis in Table   3 . Thus, we conclude that differences in the profitability of subsidiaries and the existence of TLCFs do not explain our findings.
Insert Table 12 here
United States versus Canada
So far, we include a non-EU dummy to rule out that our results are driven by geographical distance or institutional knowledge about a country's tax system. However, compared to other non-EU countries, the U.S. culture is close to that of Europe. To rule out that our results are driven by geographical or cultural differences between the investors' home countries, we compare U.S.-owned subsidiaries with Canadian-owned subsidiaries. 21 Table 13 shows that U.S.-owned subsidiaries have a more than 2.7 percentage points higher tax rate compared to Canadian-owned subsidiaries. However, this results should be interpreted with caution, as the sample contains only 62 Canadian firm-year observations (35 different subsidiaries).
Insert Table 13 here 6 Conclusion
This paper investigates the impact of a worldwide tax system at the level of a parent company on the tax aggressiveness of its subsidiaries abroad. We find that subsidiaries owned by U.S. investors show a by 1.2 percentage point higher ETR compared to subsidiaries owned by investors from a country with a territorial tax system. We argue that this is due to the high U.S.
tax rate that is levied on dividend distributions of a subsidiary when profits are repatriated.
An alternative explanation for our findings could be cultural differences across countries, such as reputational concern. However, we are not aware why especially U.S. investors should face higher reputational costs than other investors. 22 In a similar vein, the costs associated with tax avoidance should also be constant across foreign investors, as all foreign investors face the same litigation risk in the foreign jurisdiction in case of tax fraud. Nevertheless, geographical distance or similarity in the tax systems could have an effect on the costs of tax avoidance. We rule this out by testing the incremental effect of U.S.-owned subsidiaries over and above other non-EU countries, and comparing U.S.-owned subsidiaries with Canadian-owned subsidiaries.
The variable for being U.S. owned remains qualitatively the same and statistically significant.
Our study contributes to the existing literature by showing why U.S. multinationals are less tax aggressive in their foreign subsidiaries. Markle (2016) documents that parent companies in countries which apply a worldwide tax system, shift less income across jurisdictions into their foreign subsidiaries than parent companies in countries that apply a territorial tax system.
Furthermore, we document that subsidiaries owned by investors from country that applies a worldwide tax system have no incentive to take aggressive tax positions in foreign jurisdictions when the domestic tax rate does not exceed the U.S. statutory tax rate. Taxing multinationals based on their worldwide profits leads to a reduction in profitability of their foreign subsidiaries, and can lead to a wealth transfer from the residence state of the parent to the residence state of the subsidiary. This wealth transfer takes place at the cost of the parent's shareholders, who receive a lower after-tax return. This table provides descriptive statistics for the German sample. US100 equals one if the firm is wholly-owned by U.S. investors, and zero otherwise. ETR is the effective tax rate and calculated as total tax expense (including deferred taxes) divided by pretax income. ROA is pretax income divided by total assets. DEBT, PPE, and INTANG are total debt, PPE, and intangible assets deflated by total assets. SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. BIG5 is coded one if the respective company is audited by one of the top auditors in Germany (BDO, Deloitte, EY, KPMG, PwC). All non-dichotomous data are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. below the diagonal and Pearson correlations above the diagonal. US100 equals one if the firm is wholly-owned by U.S. investors, and zero otherwise. ETR is the effective tax rate and calculated as total tax expense (including deferred taxes) divided by pretax income. ROA is pretax income divided by total assets. DEBT, PPE, and INTANG are total debt, PPE, and intangible assets deflated by total assets. SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. BIG5 is coded one if the respective company is audited by one of the top auditors in Germany (BDO, Deloitte, EY, KPMG, PwC). All non-dichotomous data are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. ***/**/* mark significance at the 1/5/10% level. This table shows OLS regression results. The dependent variable is ETR which is the effective tax rate. It is calculated as total tax expense (including deferred taxes) divided by pretax income. In Model 3, the conditioning variable (PARTITION) is IMM and in Model 4 it is DIV. IMM is a dummy variable which is coded one if the ultimate owner is equal to the immediate owner. DIV is the ratio of dividends to net income. Model 5 contains the results of a matched subsample. US100 equals one if the firm is wholly-owned by U.S. investors, and zero otherwise. NON_EU is coded one if the parent company is located in a non-EU country, and zero otherwise. ROA is pretax income divided by total assets. DEBT, PPE and INTANG are total debt, PPE, and intangible assets deflated by total assets. SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. BIG5 is coded one if the respective company is audited by one of the top auditors in Germany (BDO, Deloitte, EY, KPMG, PwC). All non-dichotomous data are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. Standard errors are clustered at the home country of the investor and are provided within the brackets below the coefficients. ***/**/* marks significance at the 1/5/10% level. This table shows OLS regression results where the control variables are based on data of the parent company. The dependent variable is ETR, which is the effective tax rate calculated as total tax expense (including deferred taxes) divided by pretax income. US100 equals one if the firm is wholly-owned by U.S. investors, and zero otherwise. All control variables are based on the parent of the respective subsidiary. ROA is pretax income divided by total assets. DEBT, PPE, and INTANG are total debt, PPE, and intangible assets deflated by total assets. SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. All non-dichotomous data are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. Standard errors are clustered at the home country of the investor and are provided within the brackets below the coefficients. ***/**/* marks significance at the 1/5/10% level. This table shows OLS regression results for European countries in which the tax rate is below 35% (domestic tax plus withholding tax according to income tax treaties). The dependent variable is ETR, which is the effective tax rate. US100 equals one if the firm is wholly-owned by U.S. investors, and zero otherwise. NON_EU is coded one if the parent company is located in a non-EU country, and zero otherwise. ROA is pretax income divided by total assets. SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. Standard errors are clustered at the home country of the investor and are provided within the brackets below the coefficients. All non-dichotomous data are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. ***/**/* marks significance at the 1/5/10% level. This table shows OLS regression results for European countries in which the tax rate is above 35% (domestic tax plus withholding tax according to income tax treaties). The dependent variable is ETR, which is the effective tax rate. It is calculated as total tax expense (including deferred taxes) divided by pretax income. ETR is the effective tax rate and calculated as total tax expense (including deferred taxes) divided by pretax income. US100 equals one if the firm is wholly-owned by U.S. investors, and zero otherwise. NON_EU is coded one if the parent company is located in a non-EU country, and zero otherwise. ROA is pretax income divided by total assets. SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. Standard errors are clustered at the home country of the investor and are provided within the brackets below the coefficients. All non-dichotomous data are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. ***/**/* marks significance at the 1/5/10% level. This table shows OLS regression results for Belgium and France. The sample in Model 1 and Model 2 is limited to shareholders that have at least one observation in Belgium/France and one in the <35% sample. Conversely, Model 3 and Model 4 are limited to shareholders that have at least one observation in Belgium/France, but no observations in the <35% sample. The dependent variable in Model 1 through Model 6 is ETR, which is the effective tax rate. It is calculated as total tax expense (including deferred taxes) divided by pretax income. US100 equals one if the firm is wholly-owned by U.S. investors, and zero otherwise. ROA is pretax income divided by total assets. SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. All non-dichotomous data are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. Standard errors are clustered at the home country of the investor and are provided within the brackets below the coefficients. ***/**/* marks significance at the 1/5/10% level. This table shows OLS regression results for Japan and the United Kingdom. The dependent variable is ETR, which is the effective tax rate. It is calculated as total tax expense (including deferred taxes) divided by pretax income. US100 equals one if the firm is wholly-owned by U.S. investors, and zero otherwise. GB100 equals one if the firm is wholly-owned by investors from the United Kingdom, and zero otherwise. JP100 equals one if the firm is whollyowned by Japanese investors, and zero otherwise. ROA is pretax income divided by total assets. SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. All non-dichotomous data are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. Standard errors are clustered at the home country of the investor and are provided within the brackets below the coefficients. ***/**/* marks significance at the 1/5/10% level. This table shows OLS regression results for the German sample. The dependent variable is ETR, which is the effective tax rate. It is calculated as total tax expense (including deferred taxes) divided by pretax income. US100 equals one if the firm is wholly-owned by U.S. investors, and zero otherwise. US75 equals one if at least 75% of the investors are from the United States, and zero otherwise. US50 equals one if more than 50% of the investors are from the United States, and zero otherwise. US25 equals one if more than 25% of the investors are from the United States, and zero otherwise. US0 equals one if the respective firm has at least one U.S. investor, and zero otherwise. ROA is pretax income divided by total assets. DEBT, PPE, and INTANG are total debt, PPE, and intangible assets deflated by total assets. SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. BIG5 is coded one if the respective company is audited by one of the top auditors in Germany (BDO, Deloitte, EY, KPMG, PwC). All non-dichotomous data are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. Standard errors are clustered at the home country of the investor and are provided within the brackets below the coefficients. ***/**/* marks significance at the 1/5/10% level. This table shows OLS regression results for the German sample. In contrast to all other tables, firm-years with negative pretax income are not deleted. The sample includes only subsidiaries with more than two firm-year observations. All variables are calculated as the mean of all observations per firm over the sample period. Subsidiaries with a negative average pretax income are deleted from the sample. The independent variable is the long-run ETR, which is the average of tax payments summed over all firm-years per firm, divided by sum of pretax income summed up over all firm-years per firm. US100 equals one if the firm is wholly-owned by U.S. investors, and zero otherwise. NON_EU is coded one if the parent company is located in a non-EU country, and zero otherwise. ROA is pretax income divided by total assets. DEBT, PPE, and INTANG are total debt, PPE, and intangible assets deflated by total assets. SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. BIG5 is coded one if the respective company is audited by one of the top auditors in Germany (BDO, Deloitte, EY, KPMG, PwC). All non-dichotomous data are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. Standard errors are clustered at the home country of the investor and are provided within the brackets below the coefficients. ***/**/* marks significance at the 1/5/10% level. This table shows OLS regression results. The sample includes only subsidiaries with more than one observation; the first observation is deleted. The dependent variable is ETR, which is the effective tax rate. It is calculated as total tax expense (including deferred taxes) divided by pretax income. US100 equals one if the firm is wholly-owned by U.S. investors, and zero otherwise. NON_EU is coded one if the parent company is located in a non-EU country, and zero otherwise. ROA is pretax income divided by total assets. DEBT, PPE, and INTANG are total debt, PPE, and intangible assets deflated by total assets. SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. BIG5 is coded one if the respective company is audited by one of the top auditors in Germany (BDO, Deloitte, EY, KPMG, PwC). All non-dichotomous data are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. Standard errors are clustered at the home country of the investor and are provided within the brackets below the coefficients. ***/**/* marks significance at the 1/5/10% level. It is calculated as total tax expense (including deferred taxes) divided by pretax income. US100 equals one if the firm is wholly-owned by U.S. investors, and zero otherwise. NON_EU is coded one if the parent company is located in a non-EU country, and zero otherwise. ROA is pretax income divided by total assets. SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. All nondichotomous data are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. Standard errors are clustered at the home country of the investor and are provided within the brackets below the coefficients. ***/**/* marks significance at the 1/5/10% level
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